China's Longstanding Scientific Interest in Polar Regions
China's political interest in the Arctic seems to be relatively recent but goes back to the 1980s with science programs. The report of the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic was one of the first research publications to draw international attention to the increasing presence of China. The report analyzes Chinese activities in the Arctic, as well as the evolution of Beijing's official line regarding energy and trade issues of the region (Jakobson 2010 ). Since then, China has been the object of many articles, mass media reports and academic publications analyzing Beijing's aspirations to become one of the main actors in the Arctic and actively participate in resource management, and in the debate regarding the governance of this geographical area (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2015) . global warming in the Arctic, the impact of global warming on temperature variations and rainfall in China, etc. (for example, Yan 2005) . We researched the Wanfang Data and identified 2126 different entries including the word "Arctic" (北极 -Beiji) in the title, of which 1835 articles published by about twenty Chinese journals between 1988 and 2014. The other entries are academic works -masters and doctorates defended during the same time period (182) and conference proceedings (109). Most of these publications (30% of all) are dedicated to a broad range of climatic and geophysical issues (e.g. Gong and Wang 2003; Wu et al 2007) , while others deal with issues regarding biodiversity (15%), industry and energy resources (8%), politics and law (7%), environment (7%), transportation (5%), economics (4%) and health (1%).
What is China
Finally, an important number of articles are devoted to topics related to history, culture, art and languages spoken in the different regions and countries of the Arctic area (9%).
Since 2007, the number of publications that deal with issues specific to social sciences has increased -questions regarding sovereignty in the Arctic, analysis of the circumpolar countries' Arctic policy, the place of the Arctic in China's future economic and geostrategic development, etc. (Lu 2010; Shi 2010 China's interest in the Arctic is the focal point of academic discussions where it is tackled with much less restraint and caution (Li 2009a (Li , 2009b Zhang and Li 2010; Cheng 2011; Lu 2011) . Some Chinese scientists have asked the government to change its neutral position by becoming more involved in the process of delimiting sovereignty areas in the Arctic and dividing the resources, maybe even promoting the idea that Arctic resources should be considered as part of the heritage of humanity (Li 2009; Jia 2010; Dutton 2012; Chen 2012 has been taken up by the press (Chang 2010; Zhu 2011 ; see the analysis by Wright 2011b), but it has never been specified on which legal basis this policy might be pursued. Jia Yu (2010) , researcher at the Institute for Ocean Development Strategy of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), or Cheng Baozhi (2011) , from the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), uphold that the extension of continental shelves beyond the limits of exclusive economic zones should be limited, and the maritime space beyond these limits should fall within the heritage of humanity. Through these semi-official publications, Beijing seems to challenge sotto voce the notion of extended continental shelf as applied in the Arctic. Those opinions, sometimes very different from Beijing's official position, are not only published by conventional academic journals, but also by official Chinese periodicals that never publish content or opinions not authorized beforehand. The existence of such publications within the general trend of rising nationalism in China is difficult to interpret. It could be a sign of Beijing's will to convince the population of the importance of Arctic issues for the country's socioeconomic future and the necessity for China to become a more active player in this area of the world, or its will to let the population express this nationalism in order to divert the attention of public opinion without intentionally intervening (as hinted by Godement, 2012) . However, it would be wrong to think that all Chinese scientific articles promote actively China's interests in the Arctic. Liu and Yang (2010) or Mei and Wang (2010) take a very moderate line. It would be hard to see in the Chinese government's position a challenge of international law. Beyond the official recognition of sovereign rights of Costal States when the country was admitted as an observer on the Arctic Council, China does not seem to entertain revisionist ideas regarding the Arctic when one analyzes its standpoints and official statements (Gayazova 2013 ).
Deployment of field research tools
China's interest in the Arctic is reflected not only in academic publications, but also in the field. In 1992, before the possibility of opening the Arctic routes was abundantly discussed, Beijing organized its first five-year scientific research program in the Arctic Ocean in collaboration with the German universities of Kiel and Bremen.
This project was followed by the admission of China into international organizations with missions to lead cooperative Arctic research, such as the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) or the Pacific Arctic Group (PAG) (Xu 2012 (1999, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014) Such research tools translate an actual scientific interest, but also give Beijing the possibility of greater presence in the field, structuring a true research diplomacy in the Antarctic where China is considerably more active than in the Arctic Lasserre 2012a, 2012b; Hong 2014) . Some analysts would say that China is only one step away from taking the Arctic scientific policy and reducing it to a mere political instrument (Teeple 2010; Rainwater 2012; Brady 2013; Hong 2014) . They highlight the fact that research results are poor, considering the funds invested and that China's oil and gas interests are located in the Siberian sector of the Arctic. Drawing such a parallel might be tempting, but we should refrain from any hasty interpretation of 
An aggressive Chinese diplomacy in Arctic?

Silence on China's official position
Despite the growing interest of China in the Arctic, particularly in science, but also increasingly at the diplomatic and economic levels, no formal strategy guiding the actions and statements of the Chinese government about this region and its potential (energy, maritime, economic, scientific, military, etc.) has been published thus far.
Beijing strongly denies the existence of such a strategy and highlights the foremost scientific nature of its interest in the Arctic (Spears 2011), although it ackowledges readily that it nurtures interests in the region (Alexeeva and Lasserre, 2015 , 2012a , 2012b Thus, the Arctic region is directly linked to the security of the socio-economic development of China, and the reason underlying the interest of the Chinese government in gaining a better understanding of climate mechanisms in this region (Qin and Chen 2011; Zhan and Ren 2012) . However, the PRC officials also emphasize that most Arctic issues are "regional" and not just "national" (Gayazova, 2013) .
Therefore, by simple virtue of their geographical location, the Northeast Asian states and the EU would have a legitimate right to participate in the debates on Arctic affairs, to play an active role in the regional cooperation initiatives.
As for the issues of sovereignty in the Arctic and the exploitation of natural resources in the region, reports from Beijing are rare and remain vague. For a long time now, the Chinese government has cast doubt about its interest in these Arctic resources:
"Since there is no reliable information on oil and gas reserves in the Arctic, China is 
Active Chinese diplomacy directed at the European Arctic
Parallel to Chinese scientific activities, the Chinese government has also developed numerous political and economic partnerships with Arctic countries such as Denmark, Iceland, Sweden and Finland (Pascal 2010 The Chinese government has also developed many political and economic partnerships with Arctic countries, Norway (2001) and Denmark (2010) the Canadian company Selwyn Zinc, has invested $100 million in the project of Howard Pass Yukon (lead-zinc).
Many of these projects have been called into question because of the drop in iron ore prices in the fall of 2014: after the bankruptcy of London Mining, this development highlights the fact that for all firms including the Chinese, the Arctic remains a very expensive area in which to exploit a mineral deposit. However, it should be noted that for these multiple projects, Chinese companies have always sought an industrial partner and advanced their interests according to the rules of the market.
The exploitation of hydrocarbons, an expensive dream?
At the heart of the widely publicized coverage of the exploration of Arctic mineral and energy resources is the question of the extent of oil and gas deposits. In the face of problems acquiring drilling technology in the Arctic for Russia and even more so for China, major costs related to the development of Arctic resources and the technical embargo imposed since March 2014 by the West following the war in Ukraine, China will probably be more interested in buying oil extracted under purchase agreements or joint ventures, rather than trying to purchase operating sites by itself.
Russia needs the Chinese partnership too much to forego its support, at the risk of developing a real dependence on the Chinese market and capital. As a result of this particular geopolitical situation, in October 2014, a major agreement was signed between Gazprom and CNPC for the delivery of natural gas for 400 billion US$ (Gazprom, 2014; Newsru.com (Moscow) 18 June 2014). Despite the impressive cost of the contract, Russia has to finance the major part of infrastructure related to the project which requires the total investment of 70 billion US$. The PRC has agreed to provide only 25 billion, the rest of this sum should be secured by Russia. According to experts, in the long-term perspective, Gazprom will not gain any profit, but on the contrary, by signing partnership agreements in legal and market frameworks in areas that they target: there is no attempt at intimidation, contrary to the echoes of some media.
Furthermore, since 2011, the discovery of significant gas deposits and oil shale in China has greatly increased local hydrocarbon reserves. But these deposits are also expensive to operate and pose serious environmental issues, especially owing to the large volumes of water necessary for their operation in a very arid environment. Will these findings dampen China's interest in Arctic hydrocarbons?
Navigation in the Arctic
In Despite the economic recess triggered by international sanctions and oil-price drop, Russian government has recently declared that it will continue to invest in the Arctic and is even considering to start new projects in the area (Romanova, 2014) . One of such projects is the construction of a new container terminal in Murmansk whose main purpose will be to connect Murmansk with Chukotka, Magadan and Kamchatka.
According to the vice-governor of the Murmansk region, Chinese and Japanese private transportation companies have showed a very keen interest in the realization of this project (Romanova. 2014 railway line, "Belkomur" that will connect the White Sea, the Komi Republic and Ural in order to facilitate the export of wood to China. Although it is hard to say whether these projects will ever go beyond the discussion stage, the fact that they always include China as a potential client or investor is rather revealing. The Russian government seems to link the realization of Russian Arctic ambitions with the construction of a strong and pro-active partnership with China.
In fact, China seems more interested in Arctic routes for the additional basin of natural resources -resources that China plans to obtain by market mechanisms -rather than other transit possibilities, which do not seem to interest the ocean carriers, Western or Asian (Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011) . From this point of view, China's strategy is opportunistic: all there is to do is to explore the possibilities of access to resources and to commercial routes, knowing that in both fields, the Arctic represents only one of the numerous possibilities. With respect to resources, Chinese companies are much more active in Central Asia and Africa. Furthermore, China is investing significantly more in the development of a rail cargo service to Europe, which would also offer the advantage of bypassing Russia and certainly producing political effects in Central Asia (Huang, Lasserre and Alexeeva, 2014; Hong, 2014; Bennett, 2014) . At the end of Nonetheless, in September 2012, the Chinese press announced the conclusion of an agreement between Russian authorities and COSCO to study the profitability of commercial transit routes via the Russian Arctic zone (Zhong 2013 
Conclusion
Despite China's growing presence in the Arctic and the fact that research programs have been ongoing for some time, the country's alleged political will is a very recent fact. Many aspects have yet to be discovered and studied, because Beijing has yet to articulate an official doctrine on the subject. However, analyzing the evolution of Beijing's Arctic policy over the last fifteen years allows us to point to the existence of a strategy progressively being implemented by China to defend its interests in that region.
On the one hand, China has conducted a wide polar research program and implemented an actual management structure for its activities in the Arctic, thus reinforcing its presence in the region. On the other hand, after developing relationships with neighbouring countries of the Arctic Ocean and participating in international debates regarding the future of the Arctic and its role in the world's global development, China is now seen as a key player in the Arctic without even having direct geographic access to it. While many variables remain unknown in the ChinaArctic equation, China appears to have reached its first goal in this international matter:
making itself heard to regional governance and having options in the development of market resources via market mechanisms. Finally, there is no doubt that China is interested in the Arctic's natural resources and maritime transportation potential. The country itself is intensely active diplomatically and its companies very dynamic in the region in efforts to make China's interests materialize -conduct that is neither threatening nor different from that of any other international player.
